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The whole discourse of globalization has been revolutionized by the recent events within 
and without the Middle East.  Within the space of two tragic 9/11’s – the massacre of the World 
Trade Centre in New York City on the eleventh of September, 2001, and the bombing of three 
Amman hotels on the ninth of November, 2005 – a reality still in its beginning stages of 
materialization has, consciously or unconsciously, descended upon the governments and people’s 
of both East and West.  It is a realization that reflects the evolutionary nature of life on the planet 
as a whole, while also acknowledging the ultimate importance of mankind’s most basic unit: the 
individual.  And it is perhaps the development of the individual that we need to examine in order 
to understand our collective life.  Globalization in its political and economic manifestation has 
undoubtedly made it easier for us to conceptualize the interrelatedness of not only policy issues 
and standards throughout the world, but also the values, cultures, interests and beliefs of the 
billions that constitute our planet.  What the injustice, tyranny and oppression that characterizes 
our world today points to is the understanding that not only are we passing the formative – or 
nation-building – period of our life, but that we are experiencing the peak of our adolescence, 
bright with the passions, desires, confusion and chaos that accompany this most essential era of 
life.  While this metaphor itself adds little knowledge to the larger equation, it can prove 
insightful, and rather hopeful, in that it implies the approach of a stage of maturity or adulthood 
hardly expected amidst the recurring crises that afflict us day to day.   
 
In this examination of the roots of Islamic fundamentalism, we will trace the development of the 
Salafi Jihadi movement in Jordan and enquire as to how, through political, economic, cultural, 
religious, psychological and ideological factors – and almost always a strong mix of all – 
extremism has come to be an issue influencing and affecting all.  Adjusting the rhetoric here is 
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important.  While the current approach to understanding violent Islamist groups provides insight 
on their structure, strategies and tactics, it does little to address the crucial issue of why and how 
they exist, nor does it answer the question of who, in fact, “they” are.  While the discourse of 
jihadis is seemingly blunt and alien to us, the “free world” operates on similar, albeit opposing 
terms.  Yes, this is a facing-off of ideologies, a “clash of civilizations”, but it is also a socio-
economic crisis answered only by the best listener. The eventual victory of one, or consolidation 
of both, will ultimately be validated and confirmed by the masses purely because they constitute 
society itself.  In the eyes of jihadis, and many others who sympathize with them, this battle is 
“fair game” and this is something that needs to be acknowledged by those who believe that 
liberal democracies are not only a human right but a human necessity.  Ultimately, the aim of 
both sides is the establishment of a certain way of life, the existence of a social condition 
satisfactory to each respectively.  If human lives are truly the concern, the only legitimate 
approach is one in which the conditions necessary to make such a decision exist in the perception 
of the beholder.  Extremism, in any form, is not a security problem, it is a human one. 
 
It is understandable for people who are not familiar with the Middle East region and Arab 
culture in general – and this includes many Muslims who have lived all their lives in 
other countries - to see the development of Salafi Jihadism, and extremist networks in 
general, as some kind of crazed, sporadic phenomena of bitter, hateful people who have 
nothing better to do but destroy other people’s lives and countries.  Having grown up in 
the West, I myself have been “normalized” by largely Christian-based Western liberal 
traditions. This normalization has established, however consciously or unconsciously, the 
social, political, religious and psychological values, trends and problems that I have 
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grown up around, as basic to individual and social life.  This fact became increasingly 
apparent during my half-year spent in Jordan.  The question to ask here is “why?”.  The 
basic reality surrounding this issue lies on two levels.  The first is that the Arab 
experience in the greater Middle East has been entirely different from the experience of 
Europe and its subsequent colonial by-products (such as the United States, South Africa 
and Australia).  Parallel to this, the second level represents a truth that we sometimes find 
hard to recall or acknowledge during times of crisis or affliction:  the members of radical 
groups are also human beings and therefore influenced by religious and political 
ideologies, social trends and powerful individuals; all of which are strong characteristics 
of both ancient and contemporary European societies.  In this vein, it must be 
acknowledged that they, like all other people in the world, have feelings of ambition, love 
(for their families, colleagues and more generally those that share similar beliefs and 
goals), hate (for those that they feel have intruded or threatened their lives and societies), 
and suffer from human weaknesses, psychological and social difficulties, as well as 
issues of individual and group identity, among many others. 
 
All the issues mentioned above have been deeply elaborated on by scholarship throughout the 
ages and in all regions of the world.  That they need to be addressed collectively is a trend that 
has been compelled precisely by collective human experience and the “shrinking” of the world as 
a whole, the realization of which was a feature of the turn of the millennium.  In our retreat from 
the “trap” of Orientalism, we from the West have deliberately, albeit benevolently, moved away 
from the cultural discourse we find so hard to sensitively and wisely address; and in so doing 
have reallocated it to a more familiar domain of institutional battles, of international political 
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interests and an even subtler, but perhaps stronger, “Us” vs. “Them” paradigm.  As the current 
conflict is based essentially between [Jihadi] Muslims and Western powers, our failure in this 
sense has been the negligence of still fundamental cultural gaps that exist between “our” 
societies and “theirs”.  It is my hope that this paper will, at least partly, fill in some of those gaps 
that hinder us from holistically approaching and talking about the issue of extremism. 
 
The analytical part of this document covers the development of Salafi thought as separate from 
the Salafi Jihadis themselves, tracing the roots of their thought through major figures influencing 
their ideological discourse.  Following it is a developmental examination of the movement itself, 
covering their ideology, political thought, recruitment process, and historical roots, touching 
finally on the influence of major Jordanian figures on the movement in Iraq, the main arena of 
their current operations. 
 
ISLAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER THE OTTOMANS 
 
In examining any movement which derives its origins from an earlier movement, and 
especially one with as much history as that of Islam, it is necessary to explore, if briefly, the 
foundations of related developments that occurred throughout its history.  Undoubtedly the most 
influential political entity following the creation of the early Islamic state undertaken by the 
Prophet Muhammad Himself was the Ottoman Empire, the authority largely responsible for the 
establishment and sustenance of the Middle East’s fundamentally Islamic identity.  Looking 
briefly at the ambiguous nature of the founding of the empire and the subsequent upheavals in 
both social order and identity that marked its final stages of existence, we can thus examine the 
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evolutionary nature of Islamic political thought through different significant eras occurring 
throughout history.  Conceptualizing Islamic thought both as an ideological and civilizational 
vein will help those us from the West to acknowledge not only the necessity of recognizing the 
validity and benevolence of their goals as an independent civilization, but also to appreciate the 
profound pervasiveness of their history and ideas in the Islamic society of today. 
 
The Early Empire 
 
The spread of the Ottoman Empire, which took its last breath less than a hundred years 
ago, was originally said to have had more to do with Muslims’ profound religious devotion to the 
law, or call, of gazwa (or Holy War) than to any geopolitical influences1.  However, other 
scholars offered plausible arguments from several different angles, refuting the idea that 
Ottoman rule spread by Crusade-like conquests of Anatolia.  While “extremist” (to use an inept 
modern term) Muslims who sought to enact the law of Holy War on those who did not want to 
hop onto the ‘Muhammadan bandwagon’ certainly did exist within the Anatolian region, 
evidence suggests that this was not the driving force of Ottoman expansion.  Of the theories 
addressing Ottoman establishment throughout the Middle East, possibly the most realistic and 
pluralistic are those of Cemal Kafadar and Heath Lowry.  Kafadar, an American-educated Turk, 
saw the Ottomans as one of a variety of ethnic groups within the region who assumed a 
“Romanesque” role in the region by subjugating the other identifiable groups through superior 
administrative and physical prowess.  In their establishment as an empire, he saw the fruit of a 
Muslim polity which had grown and developed throughout the centuries.  Lowry seems to see 
this polity in a decidedly less religious light.  In the Ottoman expansion he saw an organic being, 
                                                 
1 For more information on this theory, see Paul Wittek’s famous “Gazi Thesis”. 
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a society which had as its inspiring force greed and material gain pillared by the columns of 
reward and punishment.  He suggests that the actual expansion of Muslim civilization was due 
less to religious piety than to an effort to create an environment which made it rewarding to be an 
Ottoman, and in so doing, to create a “predatory confederacy” which subsumed Muslims and 
non-believers alike under one Ottoman banner.   
 
The mode of development surrounding the creation of what was in name an Islamic 
empire proved thus to be inherently diluted and undefined.  The repercussions of such 
establishment were the stirrings of a confused Islamic identity, in belief and in the vision of the 
practical implementation of the Islamic state.  With the exception of several influential scholars 
who elaborated on original Islamic doctrine through ijtihad2, this confusion was addressed only 
centuries later, during the closing stages of the first millennium A.D, through an increasingly 
defined and far more concentrated movement dedicated to the cause of debating and ultimately 
clarifying a genuine Islamic worldview. 
 
Social, Political and Ideological Reform at the End of the Empire 
 
While a thorough examination of the history and ideological development of Islam itself 
would certainly provide invaluable insights into the development of the new jihadi current, we 
shall limit ourselves in this study to understanding the circumstances surrounding what was 
arguably the most significant transformation in modern Middle Eastern history, a change which 
was to provide the impetus for the development of two streams of thought: one rationalizing the 
                                                 
2 Term of  Islamic law which entails the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the sources of the 
law- the Qur’an and the Sunna. 
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rightful separation of the state from religion, and the other looking to reinstate Islam’s legitimate 
place at the foundation of the state (Hourani, back cover).  The former developed in relative 
proportion to the growing influence of Europe in the region and resulted in the eventual 
establishment of more “Westernized” societies manifested in the growth of the secular and 
democratic trends birthed in Europe. The latter, largely a reactionary movement to the former, 
not only looked to reaffirm the Islamic nature of the 7th century umma created by the Prophet, 
but prompted the development of a more concrete and articulate corpus of literature addressing 
the formation and foundations of the future Islamic state (al-Khilafa) and the steps required to 
reach it.  Exploration of the complex assumation of modernizing political trends in the late 
Ottoman Empire, and the separate political entities which formed out of its millet3 system as a 
result of its dissolution, is invaluable to understanding developments in modern Islamist ideology. 
 
The socio-political atmosphere of the 18th and 19th century Ottoman Empire was one 
decidedly in transition.  Simply put, the change was clearly reminiscent of the 18th C. Western 
European Enlightenment, as many of the same strains of social and political thought emerged 
within the region, including the presence of a new intelligentsia class which served as a fountain 
of new and progressive thought.  Perhaps because of its location and the Orientalist tropes which 
have plagued the region, the Middle East during this period has been frustratingly overlooked as 
a source of novel thinking, both politically and socially.  The Tanzimat (reordering) and the First 
and Second Constitutional periods of the Empire may outwardly suggest a simple reorganization 
of society but in fact could more accurately be defined as a period of reinvention.  
                                                 
3 Millets were autonomous religious or ethnic communities under the Ottoman Empire. Each millet was responsible 
to the central government for obligations such as taxes and internal security and also had responsibility for social 
and administrative functions not provided by the state.  The nation states which today make up the Arab world and 
the Balkans have stayed largely true to the boundaries formed by each millet during Ottoman times. 
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 As with all types of revolutions - moral, political or industrial - there must needs be a 
struggle between an old and a new order.  The reform struggle in the Empire started with the 
struggle between Selim III and the Janissaries, the last potent base of conservative authority.  
Selim recognized that as a reforming sultan, one needs to have a strong supporting army as well 
as the moral vindication necessary to carrying out the task (McCarthy, p. 291).  After a failed 
attempt at uprooting this institution, Sultan Mahmud II assumed the throne, and while looking to 
find favor with traditional leaders, slyly posited himself in a position of great power and respect, 
and very efficiently did away with the Janissary guards, allowing him to enforce the reforms in 
military power and administrative structure that he had envisioned.  This critical break away 
from conservatism provided the physical shift necessary for a new phase of reform supported by 
the administration.  Let it be said at this point that the Tanzimat reforms, at least from the 
perspective of the administration, was a clear push towards “Westernization” (McCarthy, p. 297).  
Though Western models of social and administrative order cannot and should not be applied to 
other societies “as is”, the basis and ultimate aim of these models can easily be rationalized as 
essentially the empowerment of the individual. 
 
Acknowledging that the basis of these reforms was a move towards a developing form of 
democracy (McCarthy, p.297), it does not take any convincing to accept that there needed to 
have been some kind of ideological drive to this end in the minds of the masses, and in addition, 
the engendering of the necessary logic within the populace required for such a system to function.  
One way in which this was accomplished, both by the Ottoman administration and reformers, 
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was the use of religion as moral justification.   Indeed, Kemal Karpat explains that in the latter 
stages of the Empire’s existence, this was the fundamental problem facing the state: 
 
The problem was aggravated by the fact that any attempt to reconcile society and 
government functionally and ideologically was bound to undermine the complex 
socio-ethnic and religious system of balances on which the traditional Ottoman 
state stood…Unable to grasp the social position into which he was pushed by 
these circumstances, the Turkish peasant used religion as a basis for group 
solidarity, and thus identified himself with the Ottoman political elite.  The elite 
eventually used this identification for the nationalist mobilization of the lower 
strata and for achieving political solidarity in the national state.  (Karpat, pp. 246, 
250) 
 
Furthermore, the changing economic and political situation, which included a laissez faire 
economic policy, the regulation of economic relations through a European system of codes and 
courts and the breakdown of the Ottoman feudal system, gave rise to a new middle class based 
on land-ownership rather than commercial enterprises (ibid, p. 260).  Karpat goes on to explain 
that this middle class provided the basis for new patterns of social stratification among the 
Muslim communities and “gave birth to a new group of communal leaders formed of ulema 
families, small merchants, landlords, and even settled tribal chieftains in the countryside, and 
eventually generated an intellectual stratum of its own.”  (ibid.)  This intellectual stratum, a 
product of Westernization, turned out to be both the Empire’s greatest gift and the 
administration’s greatest irritation.  In its closing stages, the Ottoman Empire probably reflected 
best both its most inherent weaknesses and also its most startling potential. Ottoman reforms 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected to a striking extent the vein of 
democratic organization which was to take over most of the world in the 20th century.  For an 
Islamic state which had always looked to sustain its identification with the Creator, it looked 
ominously headed towards what could have been New World glory.  More than any other empire, 
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the Ottomans were willing to include and integrate a plethora of conflicting racial, religious and 
political identities within its ever-changing boundaries.  Ultimately, Ottoman policies such as the 
Capitulations4 established multinational codependence in what was still essentially a very 
imperious political atmosphere.  In the present state of world affairs, the balance of political 
action is sustained by multinationalism (mostly to economic degrees) and one can live in relative 
safety as long as there remain reasons to sustain peace.  The environment in which the Ottoman 
Empire lay in grave peril was quite the opposite, it was still a rabidly hungry environment in 
which other empires were fighting for land and dominance. 
 
 
THE ROOTS OF SALAFI IDEOLOGY5
 
It was arguably as a result of these conditions of economic depravity, coupled with the threat of 
the establishment of secular, liberal and democratic social norms within Muslim lands that such 
currents as we will now examine were allowed to develop, aided by the environment of relative 
freedom allowing for differences in ideology and political expression.  Attempting to understand 
Salafi ideology, political thinking and ultimate goals provides us not only with insights into the 
tactics, strategies and targets of the jihadis who have assumed this doctrine, but allows us to 
acknowledge valid historical, ideological and political claims that simply cannot be ignored.  
Any efforts to this end could profoundly change the basis of Western governments’– and 
democratizing Middle Eastern governments – approaches to the issue of “terrorism”.  
                                                 
4 The Capitulations were economic pacts established with foreign, mostly European, powers allowing them free 
reign to trade within the Empire essentially without regulation, in exchange for political alliance. 
5 All information on early figures and movements in this section derived from Albert Hourani’s “Arabic Thought in 
the Liberal Age, 1789-1939”, unless otherwise noted. 
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Acknowledging that the development of radical Islamic ideology was only one of many trends 
generated by the events of the 18th and 19th centuries (many of which were growing nationalist 
and pan-Arab ideologies), the scope of this paper will regrettably only allow for the tracing of 
the roots of modern Salafi thought, leading to its eventual employment by Arab mujahideen6 
after the Soviet-Afghan War.   
 
Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
 
A product of the above-mentioned era was Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an 18th century 
Arabian reformer following the Hanbali school of theology and jurisprudence7.  In seeking to 
define what true Islam is, he renounced the validity of all gods but Allah (whether in the form of 
the “worship” of kings and leaders, and even pious religious figures) as well as the acquisition of 
customs and practices of any peoples outside Islamic society. 
 
True Islam, stated Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was that of the first generation, the pious 
forerunners (al-salaf al-salih), and in their name he protested against all those 
later innovations which had in fact brought other gods into Islam: against the later 
development of mystical thought, with its monist doctrines, its ascetic 
renunciation of the goods of the world, its organization into brotherhoods, its 
rituals other than those prescribed by the Quran; against the excessive cult of 
Muhammad as a perfect man and intercessor with God (although great reverence 
was paid to him as a Prophet); against the worship of saints and reverence for 
their shrines; and against the return into Islam of the customs and practices of the 
jahiliyya [those who are ignorant of religious reality]. (p. 37) 
 
                                                 
6 A term in Arabic literally meaning “those who carry out jihad”. 
7 One of the four main schools of thought (madhhab) in Sunni Islam founded by Ahmad Ibn al-Hanbal.  Each 
maddhab represents a correct way of “walking” in line with the actions of the Prophet (Sunna) and interpreting and 
applying the Islamic legal code, or Shari’ah (Murata & Chittick, p. 30) The Hanbali maddhab “was strongly opposed 
to all attempts at reducing the principles of Islam to a construction of the human intelligence, but showed great 
flexibility in applying them to the problems of social life.” (p. 18) 
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Here, Albert Hourani confirms the theory that the development of this ideology was not only a 
call to repent, but that it was a challenge to the dominant social forces in the region, on one hand 
to the revived strength of the Arab tribes, albeit still living under the shadow of ignorance, and 
on the other hand to the Ottoman Empire “which stood for Islamic orthodoxy not as the salaf 
were supposed to have conceived it, but as it had developed over the centuries.” (p. 38) Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab, together with the leader of a small dynasty in central Arabia,  Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa’ud , 
went on to establish the Muslim state that he had envisioned, one in which the shari’ah, and only 
the shari’ah, was to be fully implemented and life could return to the days of old, the way it is 
supposed to be –  the days of the pious forerunners, the first generation of believers in Islam, or 
salaf (included in this group is the Prophet Himself). (ibid) 
 
Ibn Taymiyya 
 
Important to the thinking of Wahhab was a thinker who lived almost half a millennium before in 
the second half of the 13th century: Ibn Taymiyya.  Acknowledged by almost all scholarship as 
the father of Salafi doctrine8, this jurist, or faqih, dealt with a problem possibly only he, as a 
faithful student of Islam and an official under Mamluk rule, could have faced: the dilemma of 
two valid and benevolent codes of law, the first being the Islamic shari’ah which left little room 
for interpretation, and the second being the Mamluk government which functioned by the rules 
of “political expediency and natural equity” (p. 19)  His theory, elucidated in his treatise al-
siyasa al-shar’iyya (The Politics of Islamic Law), bypassed this dilemma, or rather solved it, by 
                                                 
8 It must be noted that though the foundation of Salafi thought originated from him (and indirectly from the school 
of thought founded by Ibn al-Hanbal), his teachings do not necessarily embody the ideology of the current Salafi 
doctrine which underwent expansion in some aspects, reduction in others, and general refinement throughout time 
by figures such as Wahhab. 
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his formulation of a new conception of “the legitimacy of government, the unity of the umma, 
and the methodology of law.” (ibid) 
 
The essence of government, for Ibn Taymiyya, was the power of coercion, which 
was necessary if men were to live in society and their solidarity was not to be 
destroyed by natural human egoism.  Since it was a natural necessity of society, it 
arose by a natural process of seizure, legitimized by contract of association.  The 
ruler, as such, could demand obedience from his subjects, for even an unjust ruler 
was better than strife and the dissolution of society; ‘give what is due from you 
and ask God for what is due to you’9. (ibid) 
 
Both practical and realistic, what he was essentially dealing with was not only the legitimate 
foundations of state rule, but also the practical application of those foundations to a changing, 
dynamic society.  Defining what was legitimate or “just” rule (to use the terminology of the 
above paragraph) was the first task in this process, and to this end he identified the root as the 
essential purpose of human life: obedience to the will of God (as articulated, of course, by Islam).  
The second task, however, proved more difficult.  Not only had the original community 
established by Muhammad and the principal Caliphs been split up into different political entities, 
but each ruler had imposed different religious rites; essentially, different ways of life.  
Rationalizing the reality of a single, divinely-ordained code of law (the shari’ah) and a corpus of 
literature which elaborated on the right way to live (the Sunna) in light of the differences 
between the different Islamic communities proved here to be the essential challenge.  He 
effectively took a reductionist approach to this issue which is reflected in his set of solutions.  
Having established that rule was legitimate only if it was in the service of God’s will, any ruler 
who did so should be followed and obeyed.  Since all Muslims share a single doctrine, language, 
law and purpose, the shari’ah would form the organizational basis of society, both politically and 
                                                 
9 The last sentence is a quote from Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Siyasa al-shar’iyya. 
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socially, and final loyalty belonged to the Islamic community as a whole, rather than the state.  
Secondly, due to the inherent limitations that any legal code several hundred years old would 
inevitably have in addressing specific contemporary issues bound to rise under differing social, 
political and technological conditions, Ibn Taymiyya developed the concept of maslaha, or 
“public interest”.  Since the ultimate purpose of God’s laws on earth is the development and 
welfare of the community, the ruler of a society thus was bound to do everything, within the 
sphere of human relations (mu’amalat), that was conducive to the welfare of his society when 
interpretation (ijtihad) was necessary (he excluded from this issues of worship, or ‘ibadat, for 
which God’s will cannot be known).  (p. 20) To ensure both uniformity and conformity, the 
government would depend on an alliance between the political and military leaders as well as the 
‘ulama, or religious scholars. (p. 21) This, in its broadest outline, was the basis of the Islamic 
state from which other scholars were to expand, promoting or adapting it according to both their 
own interpretations and the exigencies of time.  
 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida 
 
The last two figures to be addressed form the last historical current of the ideological 
development of Salafism.  Due to the close juxtaposition of their lives, these scholars built on 
each other in quick succession, marking a definite push towards linking the aging movements 
from which they derived their inspiration with a new generation of eager Muslims existing in the 
20th century.   
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Like Ibn Taymiyya before him, Muhammad Abduh’, an Islamic scholar of the late 19th 
century and one of Egypt’s most influential reformers, saw the establishment and 
implementation of the Muslim state as a mixture of divinely ordained laws and essential truths, 
and the use of reason in the form of ijtihad.  ‘Abduh placed great emphasis on the application of 
reason not only to basic religious doctrine but also to modern social circumstance; indeed, he 
believed that the only real kaffir, or infidel, was the individual who closes his eye to the light of 
truth and refuses to examine rational explanations for perfectly reasonable phenomena. (p. 148) 
To this end, he justified the utility and assumption of modern sciences by Muslims without the 
acceptance or validation of the “religion of materialism” from which they came, nor rejecting 
their own.  The society he envisioned was one which also formed a part of his memory:  he 
rejoiced at the remembrance of the golden age of Islamic civilization, a time stretching from the 
age of the early followers of the Prophet until the period of the great theologians of the 3rd and 4th 
Islamic centuries, whom he also considered part of the salaf (p. 149)  More importantly, Abduh’ 
acknowledged the distinction between matters of worship and matters of human relations 
(‘ibadat wa mu’amalat) proffered by his spiritual ancestor, Ibn Taymiyya, but now went on to 
expand the principle of maslaha as well as another juristic function: talfiq.  With regards to 
maslaha, ‘Abduh extended the use of ijtihad to explain the Qur’an and hadeeth by making it a 
rule for “deducing specific laws from general principles of social morality.” (p. 152)  Through 
human reasoning, ‘Abduh taught, divine principles need to be applied to specific problems in 
everyday life, as well as be subject to change as conditions change, of course always keeping the 
general welfare of the community at the fore.  His expansion of the second principle, that of 
talfiq, or “piecing together”, added a new dimension to ijtihad itself and attempted to bridge 
already existing gaps between different interpretations of Islamic teachings.  Before, talfiq was 
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based on “[the] notion that in any particular case a judge could choose that interpretation of the 
law, whether it came from his own legal code or not, which best fitted the circumstances” (ibid), 
but ‘Abduh essentially reinvented it into something far broader, 
 
…not simply the ‘borrowing’ of a specific point from some other code, but a 
systematic comparison of all four, and even of the doctrines of independent jurists 
who accepted none of them, with a view to producing a ‘synthesis’ which would 
combine the good points of all… The logical implication of this method was the 
creation of a unified and modern system of Islamic law. (ibid) 
 
 One of ‘Abduh’s students, a Syrian named Rashid Rida, was the next in the line of 
prominent scholars basing his thoughts on core Salafi principles.  Holding similar ideological 
views to ‘Abduh, the focus of Rida’s life was also the search for answers to the backwardness of 
Muslim societies as well as ways to contribute to the development of a concrete Islamic 
civilization. (p. 228)  Like so many before him, Rida watched, with mix of frustration and 
fascination, the modern developments occurring in Europe, trying to rationalize the rather 
dilapidated state of the contemporary Muslim world.  He saw within Europe a dynamism and 
drive that pushed them to sacrifice their lives and resources for what they believed was the 
furthering of their own society; the strengthening of their national identities in addition to 
striking technological developments. What Rida subsequently strove to instill within his 
community was that Muslims, too, could find such a principle of unity and loyalty within Islam.  
In fact, jihad in its most general sense implies “positive effort”, an activity essential to Islam and 
one at which the Europeans appeared to be excelling. (p. 229)  It is here where Rida and his 
teacher differed: while ‘Abduh principally looked to a return to life as the salaf lived it, Rida 
considered the unity of Sunnis and Shi’ites as essential to the development of the community. (p. 
230)  That said, it is clear from his writings that he largely discredited the Shi’ih establishment 
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and was always quick to blame them during challenging times.  “Shi’ism was full of ‘fairy tales 
and illegitimate innovations’; its leaders were preventing unity from selfish love of money and 
glory; it sprang from a doctrinal difference which did not exist in the time of the salaf, and was 
largely owing to the machinations of the first Jewish converts to Islam.” (p. 231)  Finally, Rida 
further developed the principle of maslaha over the efforts of Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad 
‘Abduh.  For him, “public interest” became the operative base in the decision-making process, 
posing that other commands and prohibitions limit the arena in which reason can work. 
  
 …what Rashid Rida is saying in fact is that there is and can be no ijma’ 
[agreement], even that of the first generation, in matters of social morality; or, in 
other words, that the Muslim community has legislative power.  The rulers of the 
community have not only the executive and judicial powers, they can legislate in 
the public interest.  Thus there can be a body of ‘positive law’ (qanun) 
subordinate to the Shari’a in the sense that if there is conflict it is the latter which 
is valid, but otherwise independent and with a binding force which derives 
ultimately from the general principles of Islam; for it is not only the right but the 
duty of a Muslim nation to give itself ‘a system of just laws appropriate to the 
situation in which its past history has placed it’. (p. 234) 
 
The figures discussed above constitute only a few of the more widely recognized scholars 
contributing to the development of Salafi thought.  To claim that their theories, and more 
especially the limited ones picked out for this study, provide an all-round understanding of the 
nature of the modern Salafi movement would be both naïve and misleading considering the 
significance of other modern Salafi scholars such as Ibn Baz, Utheimeen and Ubeikan, among 
others (Shishani).  However, the core issues of the nature of the state, political approaches and 
goals, and attitudes toward European involvement and influence are amply considered. 
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THE MODERN SALAFI JIHADI MOVEMENT 
 
Prelude:  Islam and the West 
 
Considering that the current efforts of the Salafi Jihadi movement are focused on America and 
the West, it may be useful here to outline the general framework of Muslims’ differences with 
the West, culminating in the current political atmosphere of violence.  In his paper, The Roots of 
Muslim Rage10 (Lewis), Bernard Lewis, the famous Western scholar of the Middle East, touches 
on the essential cultural gaps existing between Muslim civilization and those based on the Judeo-
Christian tradition.   
 
At the outset, it is insightful to note that the separation of Church and state was only really 
institutionalized around 300 years ago.  The reasons for this being largely as a result of the 
Christian experience, Muslims have traditionally never seen a need for such a separation, nor 
tried to rationalize it as the West has11.  Secondly, while Islam has itself experienced periods of 
cruelty and violence, this trend has been mirrored in the development other religious traditions, 
not the least of which is Christianity.  In addition, major religious traditions such as Christianity 
and Judaism are, like Islam, influenced by the dualist concept of a “cosmic clash” between Good 
and Evil.  Related to this is the assumption of an essential human division, also shared by these 
three traditions: the religious “us and them” paradigm which separates the Faithful from those 
                                                 
10 All facts in this section derived from this short paper by Bernard Lewis. Footnotes by author. 
11 Except, for example, when European thought provided some answers to Muslim societal discontent, i.e. the era 
leading up to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 
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living in ignorance12.  This concept helps not only to identify the “enemies of God”, but also to 
define or develop the perception of self.  This perception of self, for Muslims, has been 
consistently diminishing ever since the power of the Ottoman Empire was substantially 
challenged in the late 17th century and the rise of the European colonial powers posed a serious 
threat to societies all over the world.  
 
“Imperialism”, in much of Islamic literature in fact connotes “missionary”.  For a religion which 
believes in the rightful authority of the Faithful over the Unbelievers, colonialism was more than 
a hard pill to swallow, it was a deep-seated challenge to the principles and way of life promised 
them by God.  That such a challenge came from “infidels” was wholly blasphemous.  However, 
fundamental Islamists could not have been wrong in thinking that Western civilization 
constituted the biggest threat to their way of life, a threat still very much alive today.  That said, 
events within the Western world, particularly the two World Wars (in which, ironically, the 
warring countries undermined each other and spread propaganda within the Islamic world) and 
the development of new commercial, financial and industrials methods (though this process 
brought a lot of wealth, it ultimately ended up in the hands of Westerners or Westernized 
minorities) created a vein of rejection and hostility, devaluating Westerners in the eyes of 
millions of Arabs. 
 
Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and form to the otherwise aimless and 
formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have 
devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed 
them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent 
even their livelihood…It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a 
movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments 
that pursue them. (Lewis) 
                                                 
12 This is very much the concept of jahilliya mentioned in the section on Salafi Jihadi political thought.  In their 
view of the world, they are the only true Faithfuls and the rest of the world are kuffar, or infidels. 
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 Definitions 
 
Before probing into the development of the modern Salafi Jihadi movement, some definitional 
issues need to be addressed.  Acknowledging that scholarship – both Arab and Western – on 
Salafi Jihadism is wholly underdeveloped, it should be noted that some of the scholarship that 
does exist is somewhat misleading, or at least ambiguous, about the definition of who, in fact, 
they are and where they come from.  One theory is that Salafism is split into three groups, of 
which the jihadi vein is only the most radical.  More accurately, though, Salafi Jihadis were first 
“jihadi”, and then only “Salafi”, rather than the other way around. 
 
Salafi ideology, rather, is split between two groups of scholars who acknowledge the same 
ideological ancestors and share the same core beliefs and principles but are divided by their 
approaches to change: traditionalists and reformists, or taqlidi and islahi.  Taqlidi, or traditional 
Salafis are against involvement in politics, even in current, albeit “corrupted” (in their eyes) 
Muslim regimes.  The vein is strictly religious and therefore looks to create societal change 
through non-violent, non-political means such as culture and education.  In Jordan, they have 
their own activities which they carry out freely due to their tangibly non-threatening nature 
(Shehadeh).  The islahi, or reformist trend of Salafism appeared during the 80’s and builds 
somewhat on the traditional vein. Islahi Salafism sees its vision being met through both 
educational means and political maneuvering, but also rejects the use of violence in this process 
(Shishani).  In the modern age, traditional Salafis look for direction to scholars such as Nasser 
al-Din al-Albani (see below, History) and ‘Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, who have all built on the 
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essential principles laid down by Taymiyya and Wahhab (Shishani), while the reformists look to 
figures such as Abduh and Rida who were influenced largely by European intellectual trends and 
place a large emphasis on rational thought that adopts Islamic life to contemporary social 
circumstance.  That said, Salafism, even in the modern era, should be looked at both as the basis 
and culmination of a collective “bouncing around” of ideas between scholars from various trends 
of thought.  Strict separation of thought has never been a feature of a developing ideological 
discourse. 
 
The Salafi Jihadi movement is, at its core, a synthesis of two experiences.  On the one hand is the 
largely peaceful Salafi ideology as outlined above, and on the other is the jihadi experience in 
Afghanistan.  Essentially, the Arab war against the Soviets, begun in 1979, introduced both 
Arabs from all over the Middle East to each other, as well as the Islamist ideologies that they 
brought with them from their home countries, thus producing a synthesis of successful Islamic 
jihad with growing ideological cohesion.  It was during this war that these fighters realized the 
similarities of their goals, and eventually adopted the doctrine that not only best fit their needs 
but met with their vision of the future Islamic state, the creation of which is their ultimate goal 
(Shishani).  Despite their shared ideological background, Salafi Jihadis made a very clear break 
from Salafis themselves, especially rejecting reformists such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid 
Rida13 (most probably because of their consideration of and openness to Western rites and 
thought trends), dismissing them for not assuming a strict reading of the Qur’an.  The feeling, 
though, was and still is mutual.  Most Salafis, traditional or reformist, shun the jihadis, not 
                                                 
13 Here is an example of where different group stances and ideology cannot be separated from ideological 
development.  Even though they reject Rida, Salafi Jihadis today have a markedly anti-Shi’ih stance which can be 
seen in the thought of Rashid Rida.  They also reject Ibn Taymiyya’s tolerance of other cultural rites through their 
strict application of the Qur’anic tradition, while at the same time accepting ‘Abduh’s concept of the salaf as 
representing the first few generations of Muhammad’s followers. 
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associating their own groups with a group that they largely disagree with on account of their use 
of violence to overthrow regimes (Shishani). 
 
Salafi Jihadis do share something in common, though, with reformist Salafism:  they both 
appeared as conscious movements after 1979, following the Iranian Revolution.  The 
significance of the Revolution in this respect was that it brought about the realization that regime 
change was possible through revolution14 (Shehadeh).  Adnan Abu Odeh shares that, apart from 
the recognition by Arab Islamists that regime change could come about through revolt, the 
Iranian Revolution showcased a new model of leadership; it showed them that, Shi’ite or not, 
religionists themselves could also be politicians.  This development gave Islamists a definite 
boost towards the political aspect of societal change (Abu Odeh).   
 
Salafi Jihadi groups today constitute almost all Islamic jihadi groups in the world, with the 
exclusion of a stubborn few who have either 1) not realized that without joining the others they 
cannot possibly achieve their goals, or 2) pursue fundamentally different aims to those of other 
groups.  Its two largest and most influential networks are those of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda (The 
Base) and Zarqawi’s Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad fii Bilaad al-Rafidain (Monotheism and Jihad in the 
Land between the Two Rivers, i.e. Mesopotomia or today’s Iraq), which itself was subsumed 
under the al-Qaeda umbrella in 2005.  The official amalgamation of these networks represents a 
level of unity, cooperation, capability, influence and infamy never before seen in political Islam 
and which is founded upon a network of like-minded people stretching from London and Madrid 
in Europe, through the entire Middle East, to south-east Asia. 
                                                 
14 The Iranian Revolution was admittedly administered by Shi’ite Muslims who hold largely different views of Islam 
from the Sunni sect. This difference, however, at least within the terms of political Islam, was still largely 
unqualified at the time. 
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 Political Thought Articulated 
 
A network of such vast proportions must needs have a simple, accessible and familiar set of core 
beliefs.  For all intents and purposes, this is exactly what defines the Salafi Jihadis, though they 
have their own ideologists to cater for those who desire deeper and more detailed explanations 
and justifications (in the form of “decrees”, or fataawa) as to what they are and will be doing.  
As you will probably be able to tell, the essentials of their beliefs are embedded in the ideologies 
circulated by their spiritual forefathers. 
 
At the core of their doctrine is their “call”, or daw’a.  Since, as Muslims, they are required to 
submit their wills to the Will of God as exampled perfectly by the Prophet, their call is also the 
Prophet’s call: tawheed or monotheism (Shehadeh).  This emphasis on monotheism reflects the 
Salafi dimension of the movement.  Monotheism in Islam implies three levels of oneness: the 
oneness of the lordship of God (there is only one lord of the universe, and that is God Himself), 
the oneness of the worship of God (none has the right to be worshipped but God), and the 
oneness of the names and qualities of God (it is not accessible to name or qualify God except 
with what the Prophet named or qualified Him; none deserve to be named or qualified with the 
definitive names or attributes of God). (Al-Shomar, p. 11) 
 
From tawheed, Salafi Jihadis derive three main concepts (Shehadeh): 
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1) Al-Hakimeeya (governorate):  The only valid state is the one based on a strict application 
of shari’ah, or Islamic law (which has its own structure of authority). All other 
constitutions, governments or armies are considered as infidels, including those of 
“corrupted” Muslim countries. (Abu Rumman, b) 
2) Wallaa’ wa Barraa’ (loyalty and denial):  This implies loyalty only to the faithful (for 
Salafi Jihadis, they themselves constitute the only true body of faithful Muslims) and 
rejection, or denial, of infidels. (Abu Rumman, b) Infidels represent those who are not 
Muslims, including Shi’ites, as well as those Muslims who support infidels, i.e. in Iraq, 
they kill only Muslims who perform a duty in support of the occupiers, i.e. drivers, Iraqi 
police forces.  According to the shari’ah, if someone is considered an infidel “warrior” 
they should be dealt with as warriors, and can be killed.  The rationalization of this can be 
seen in the attack on the World Trade Centres: since Israel occupies and is essentially 
“attacking” an Islamic land, and America is a strong supporter of them, the U.S. 
government, too, is considered an attacking force.  The fact that Americans themselves 
not only voted in, but pay taxes to the government thus makes all Americans warriors. 
(Shehadeh) 
3) Al-Jihad:  There are many types of jihad in Islam, three of which are defensive jihad 
(fighting when attacked), offensive jihad (attacking infidel regimes), and the jihad of the 
individual soul (the individual’s struggle against the self in his attempt to submit his will 
to God’s Will). (Shehadeh) 
 
While these thoughts are a more general interpretation of Islam, they have beliefs, or more 
accurately, a number of claims, which are specific to them as a movement existing within the 
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current political milieu of the world.  These thoughts were enumerated in an interview with Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the principal Salafi Jihadi ideologue in Jordan and one of the central 
theorists of the movement as a whole15. 
 
Firstly, they never dwell on their plight in this world, they look purely toward the afterlife, 
seeing the path of jihad as the road to heaven.  They see the dangers of their efforts to this end – 
such as arrest, disasters and martyrdom – as the way of the prophets and saints and welcome 
confrontation as an inevitability between God’s faithful servants and the “followers of Satan” 
and the “soldiers of idolatry”.  The faithful man is not responsible for securing his own fate as 
his fate is determined only by God – triumph will be awarded by patience.  A common 
expression used by Salafi Jihadi teachers in introducing this concept to their members is a quote 
from the writings of Sayyid Qutub (see History for more on his life and writings):  “On this road 
there is neither position, importance nor money.  On this road are blood, tears and skeletons”16, 
yet it is the only road which leads to heaven. 
 
Second is a dichotomy essential to their purely political thought, a conceptualization of their 
enemies into two “manageable” groups: “the close enemy” and “the far enemy”, both of which 
must be conquered.  The Close Enemy implies all “corrupted” Arab governments (of which they 
currently all are, according to their definition), and the Far Enemy constitutes the rest of the 
world’s governments, but more especially the United States and Israel, since they are seen as 
current “occupiers” of Muslim lands, i.e. Palestine and Iraq.  Through such conceptualizations, 
they expanded the Islamic concept of jahiliyya, which originally referred to the age of ignorance, 
                                                 
15 The following three paragraphs are taken form the interview between Maqdisi and Muhammad Abu Rumman 
(Abu Rumman, c).  
16 Informal translation by the author, though this text is also published in English. 
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idolatry and paganism that the world was living in before the advent of Islam, to include peoples 
and governments still existing who are apparently still cast under this shadow of ignorance. The 
original idea behind this theory was that, because attacking the Far Enemy would incite the Close 
Enemy to crack down on their movement, they should first make a concerted effort to eliminate 
the Close Enemy.  However, though this conceptualization is still valid and used, different Salafi 
Jihadi movements focus on one or the other pretty much as they please. 
 
Third is an in depth refusal of a number of things not necessary to enumerate.  What needs to be 
known is that all refusals, such as of political parties, leaders, democracy, pluralism, validity of 
Shi’ism, etc. are refuted simply on the basis that 1) they were not instituted by shari’ah, and/or 
2) they are connected, and directly or indirectly support, those who are still living in jahiliyya. 
 
Recruitment 
 
One of the most important parts of the establishment of Salafi Jihadi groups is their actual 
makeup.  In Marwan Shehadeh and Urs Gehriger’s “Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi: In the Network of 
the Phantom”, the process and methods of recruitment are delineated: 
 
The recruiting procedure consists of several phases: after establishing contact 
through acquaintances or at the mosque, a would-be member is assigned to a 
study group where he is informed about the group’s ideological, social and 
political position.  He is then accepted into the organization on a provisional basis.  
The real test is considered to be a spell in prison.  The Zarqawi network in Jordan 
is under constant surveillance, and its members are frequently arrested.  There is 
usually no concrete charge, and the members are usually set free again after 
several weeks or months.  Anyone capable of remaining true to the group’s 
principles through interrogations, often accompanied by torture, has provided an 
important proof of loyalty. 
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Next, the new member is entrusted with his first tasks in a terrorist cell, in 
accordance with his particular physical and mental skills.  This often involves 
work that strengthens the network or provides logistical support for the fighters on 
the front line in Iraq. Only those who prove their worth during this phase qualify 
for higher duties or become an emir, the head of a terrorist cell. 
 
Those wishing to go to the front themselves require a reference from at least two 
long-standing members of the Zarqawi group vouching for the candidate’s 
seriousness, competence and reliability.  It is not unheard of for young men to set 
off for Iraq without such letters of recommendation, a venture that often ends in 
tragedy for the battle-hungry volunteers. Either they are arrested on their journey, 
or the terrorist group in Iraq considers them untrustworthy and immediately sends 
them, without their knowledge, on a suicide mission.  (Gehriger & Shehadeh, 3) 
 
This process is largely in line with Quintan Wiktorowicz’s analysis of the psychology of 
recruitment, though it does little to explain initial interest in the group itself.  In his study of a 
British jihadi group called Al-Muhajiroun17, Wiktorowicz explains that at the heart of any 
decision to join such a group is a multi-leveled process of persuasion (p. 1).  He identifies four 
key processes that enhance the likelihood of a potential joiner.  The first of them he terms 
“cognitive opening”, the point at which an individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new 
ideas and worldviews.  The next process, “religious seeking” is simply the individual’s search for 
meaning through religious idiom, and is followed by his actual contact with the group.  “Frame 
alignment” defines this stage, where the public representation adopted by the radical group is 
agreeable with the individual and attracts his initial interest.  The culmination of his introduction 
to the group itself is “socialization”, where the individual experiences religious lessons and 
activities offered by the group, facilitating their “indoctrination, identity construction and value 
changes.”  (p. 1)  While there is general agreement among past scholars that individuals join 
groups and movements in response to crisis, it must be made clear that “grievances may provide 
impetus for joining, but other factors such as the level of repression or resource availability 
                                                 
17 All information in this paragraph from this study (Wiktorowicz). 
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influence about participation.”  (p. 1) The actual decision to join supplements the socialization 
process.  It is at this point that exogenous conditions can “suddenly inject a degree of uncertainty 
into the process, producing a halting or uneven trajectory.” (p. 3) When the individual actually 
chooses to be a member, the group will then instruct him to become a leader, organizer or 
participant in the movement activities directed toward replicating the movement message.  This 
process itself then solidifies the member’s identity with the movement. (p. 3) 
 
History 
 
The beginning of the modern Salafi movement dates back to less than forty years ago in 1969 
(Shehadeh), the timing of which one would struggle to separate from the monumental regional 
reverses that happened two years before when the Israeli Air Force single-handedly demolished 
the Arab armies in a matter of six days.   
 
The Salafi current as a whole was popularized by Nasser al-Din al-Albani, a Damascene scholar 
specializing in the hadeeth, or the speech of the Prophet Muhammad.  Having developed strong 
relations with the Ikhwan Muslimeen, or Muslim Brotherhood18, in Jordan, al-Albani began 
frequenting Jordanian cities during the 1970’s, giving lectures and disseminating his ideology, 
especially in the Brotherhood stronghold of Zarqa. Despite the Brotherhood’s assistance in this 
process, it had clear ideological differences with that of the Salafi Albani, and ultimately the new 
doctrine started gaining popularity galvanized by the addition of new adherents. (Shehadeh) 
 
                                                 
18 Also known simply as the Brotherhood.  Though different political entities, their existence in Jordan is a 
continuation of the original Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
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As Jordan was being introduced to the Salafi doctrine, Egypt was experiencing the practical 
effects and growth of jihadis.  Not even a decade before Albani’s “missionary trips” to Jordan, a 
man known to the world only as Sayyid Qutub published a work that was to change the nature of 
Islamic political thought and radicalize fundamentalist Islamic groups the world over.  A former 
member of the Egyptian Education Ministry, Qutub in fact received his Masters degree in 1950 
from the Colorado State College of Education.  Already a scholar of Islamic political thought, 
but influenced slightly by the socialist movement, he is said to have been radicalized partly due 
to his experience in the United States, where he was disgusted with the ingrained racism and 
sexual openness of the society (Wikipedia, a).  However, his imprisonment under the reign of 
Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser of Egypt essentially fed, matured and completed his radical political 
thought, resulting in the publishing of his seminal work, “ma’alim fee al-tareeq” (lit. “Signs on 
the Road”), published in English as “Milestones”.  According to Ibrahim Gharaibeh, Director of 
Research at al-Ghad, a prominent daily in Jordan, this book was probably the most important 
book in the last 500 years of Islamic political thinking (Gharaibeh, a), thoroughly rationalizing 
and laying down justification for the right, and duty, of Muslims to “step forward and take 
control of the political authority so that it may establish the Divine system on earth…”  (Qutub)  
 
The reasons for Jihaad…are these: to establish God’s authority in the earth; to 
arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish 
all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man 
over others since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to 
make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them.  These reasons are 
sufficient for proclaiming Jihaad.  However, one should always keep in mind that 
there is no compulsion in religion; that is, once the people are free from the 
lordship of men, the law governing civil affairs will be purely that of God, while 
no one will be forced to change his beliefs and accept Islam. (Qutub) 
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Acknowledging the main emphasis of political Islam as being, by definition, the establishment of 
an Islamic polity, and despite Qutub’s strong conjectures about the validity of the use of jihad to 
“end the lordship of one man over others”, it is important to note here the emphasis on freedom 
of religion.  That this point is stressed repeatedly throughout Qutub’s writings, and this is a 
common feature of most Islamic political writing, highlights the genuine desire of Islamists, even 
the radical ones, to establish Islam as the basis of society rather than force their religion onto the 
masses, a common misconception in the West.   
 
Turning away from theology, we return to the establishment and growth of jihadism.  The effect 
of Qutub was obvious.  It wasn’t long before the “dynamic duo” of Islamiya Jihadiya (Islamic 
Jihad) and Jama’at al-Islamiya appeared in Egypt, the first two jihadi groups in modern political 
Islam19 (Gharaibeh).  A student of Sayyed Qutub and one of their main ideologists, Abd al-
Salaam Faraj expanded the jihadi ideology through his book entitled al-fareeda al-gha’iba, or 
“The Absent Duty”.  The “duty” it is referring to is of course jihad, and “absent” suggests the 
lack of action Muslims have taken thus far towards fulfilling this duty.  However, this document 
is more well-known, and infinitely critical, for its conceptualization of the enemy in two distinct 
categories: the “close enemy” and the “far enemy”, as discussed in the section “Political Thought 
Articulated”. 
 
Marwan Shehadeh, an early member of Islamic Jihad in Jordan, and currently a journalist and 
researcher, relates that four events in the Middle East during this period brought jihadi Islam to 
the fore, two of which happened in 1979.  The first of these was also the first ever violent 
                                                 
19 There did exist a few informal groups centered on figures like Abu al-Ala al-Mawdoodi and Sayyid Qutub, 
however Islamic Jihad and Jama’at al-Islamiya were the only two with established networks of adherents who 
followed a definite ideology and recognized leaders. 
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operation carried out against a regime.  It happened in 1973/4 when a military uprising broke out 
with the goal of killing Anwar Sadat, then Egyptian president.  The perpetrators, the Military 
Brigade Organization under the leadership of Dr Saleh Suriyeh, failed miserably and six of the 
group were hung, including Suriyeh.  1979 witnessed the Iranian Revolution as well as Juhaiman 
al-Utaybi’s armed uprising operated from the Ka’aba in Mecca in which he planned to kill the 
royal family.  He, too, was caught and subsequently executed.  Finally, however, one plan 
worked: the second attempt to assassinate Sadat.  The Egyptian president had recently secured 
peace with Israel through the Camp David agreements and this was unacceptable to a group such 
as Islamic Jihad, a sworn enemy of the current occupiers of the Palestinian Land- the Israelis.  
During this period, Sadat was attempting to shift support from Russia to the West and in so doing 
made one vital mistake which led to his own downfall:  he had tried using Islamic groups to help 
him shift to a capitalist system, and thus gave them freedom to move around without keeping 
tabs on them.  This freedom coupled with Egyptian-Israeli peace and development towards the 
West invoked a harsh rebuke.  Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 was only one step of Islamic 
Jihad’s plan to overthrow the regime in Egypt. (Shehadeh) 
 
The Establishment of Salafi Jihadism in Jordan 
 
Following the events of 1981, one of the founders of Islamic Jihad in Egypt, a Palestinian named 
Muhammad Salem Rehal, escaped from Egypt to Jordan because of his involvement in the 
assassination.  Continuing his mission from Egypt, Rehal decided to establish Islamic Jihad in 
Jordan20, into what was assuredly a far more dangerous environment for the revolutionary21.  
                                                 
20 Its creation is estimated at the beginning of 1982, which would account for the time necessary for Rehal to leave 
Egypt and establish himself in Jordan. 
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Indeed, after two or three years of existence, despite having garnered a sizeable amount of 
recruits, he was caught and put in custody for two years.  A year following the arrest of 
numerous other members, Islamic Jihad in Jordan ceased to exist. (Shehadeh) 
 
By 1982 in Jordan, however, al-Albani had established himself as the leader of the traditional 
Salafi movement, and was surrounded by a group of elite recruits22 who expanded upon, and 
helped solidify, their ideology.  One of these, and perhaps the most important, was Omar 
Mahmud Uthman Abu Omar, widely known simply as Abu Qatada23.  Born in 1961, the 
Palestinian thinker grew up in the Ras al-‘Ayn area of Amman.  Having completed his 
undergraduate studies at the University of Jordan, Abu Qatada attempted to complete his 
graduate studies but ended up joining the Jordanian Army, working for four years as a lieutenant 
in the information department.  His work in this field is significant because it gave him insight 
into the different wings of Islamic thinking, one of which was the Salafi current just 
materializing at the end of the eighties. Diversifying his reading and expanding his ideological 
resources, Abu Qatada, along with some of his like-minded colleagues, started working on 
creating a Salafi movement in Jordan.  This project, however, failed because of its rejection by 
Sheikh Albani and his other students, so instead they formed the Ahl al-Sunna (People of the 
Sunna) movement which represented the left wing of the Jordanian Salafi movement.  Failing 
again to create a successful movement, Abu Qatada left Jordan in 1991, after which he started to 
develop and strengthen his own political and religious thinking.  Settling in Britain in 1994, he 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 The Jordanian mukhabarat, or General Intelligence Department (GID) is renowned for its abilities to eliminate 
potential threats before they manifest themselves, largely due to their pervasive penetration into radical Islamist 
circles. 
22 Among his most famous disciples are Ali Halabi, Mashhoor Hassan, Muhammad Shakra, Muhammad Nasib al-
Rifai and Abu Qatada. 
23 All background to the life of Abu Qatada provided by Muhammad Abu Rumman, unless otherwise noted. For 
more information on his life and influence, see Abu Rumman’s “Abu Qatada al-Flsteenee, filusoof tandheemaat al-
‘anf”. 
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established himself as a central Salafi theorist, supervising many magazines such as Al-Fajr and 
Al-Manhaj and acting as an informant and thinker for Salafi groups in North Africa.  Most 
importantly, he issued a powerful book, al-jihad wa al-ijtihad (Jihad and the Process of 
Interpretation), in which he elaborated the theories and foundation of the Salafi Jihadi movement.  
This book is considered the strongest piece of literature addressing the Salafi Jihadis, 
convincingly interpreting and justifying their ideas and vision24.  Between 1985 and 1987, 
another disciple of Albani, Muhammad al-Rifai, created another Salafi Jihadi group in an attempt 
to make up for the failure of Rehal just a few years before.  This time, the impetus was the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine, but this time, too, Rifai was captured and imprisoned (Shehadeh).   
 
Social Transformation in Jordan and the Middle East 
 
Given the failures of Salafi Jihadi operations during the eighties, one might conclude that the 
movement as a whole would have been dampened and perhaps even collapse, but the 
mukhabarat’s intervention in their operations only served to push the movement underground.  
Instead, two critical forces brought the Salafis back to the forefront, and this time they arrived 
stronger, more cohesive and more united than they had ever been. 
 
The first of these was the internal dynamic developing in Jordan starting from the late 1980’s.  
1989 brought what was to be a landmark in the social and economic life of the country: the debt 
crisis.  Already weak structurally, the Jordanian economy collapsed in the wake of 
“inappropriate government policy responses to three events: the revenue slump of the 1980’s, the 
                                                 
24 Abu Qatada was known for his sharp tongue and bitter criticism of other Islamic movements, as well, of course, as 
his enemies. He was recently released from prison and is currently under house arrest in England.  It is still unknown 
whether he will be tried in Britain, handed to the Jordanian authorities, or released. 
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Iran-Iraq War and the Jordanian renewal to the claim of sovereignty over the West Bank earlier 
in the year.”  (Knowles, p. 95)  Riots broke out in Ma’an25 soon after, and these were followed 
later by similar riots in the southern and central parts of the country.  Mustafah Hamarneh of the 
Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan offers that these popular riots “paved the 
way for the momentous changes that began to occur in the country” for several reasons: 
 
First, this was a Trans-Jordanian political act; the Palestinian segment of the 
population remained conspicuously indifferent.  Second, the price increase 
followed Jordan’s most severe economic crisis – the [Jordanian D]inar was 
significantly devalued and foreign debt reached the $10 billion mark.  Third, the 
riots were spontaneous, i.e. political parties, at the initial stages of the riots, were 
notoriously absent…This was an anti-government, anti-corruption and 
mismanagement, pro-reform and pro-public participation political act… 
(Hamarneh, p. 60) 
 
The International Crisis Group adds that the privatization drive which followed the 1992 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund also resulted in cuts in public sector jobs (of 
which Trans-Jordanians make up a majority), which not only aggravated the problem but further 
“eroded the power of tribal leaders who used to dispense patronage in the form of public sector 
employment.” (ICG, p. 5) While it is generally acknowledged by current scholarship that the 
disenchantment of the public in Jordan as a result of governmental political and economic 
failures served as a significant impetus for the turn to radical Islam, the non-participation of 
Palestinians mentioned in the above paragraph does little to explain the high level of subsequent 
jihadi activity in largely Palestinian neighborhoods.  There were, however, several other reasons 
affecting the social transformation occurring in the nineties, and it is to these that we will now 
turn. 
                                                 
25 Ma’an is a city in the south of Jordan.  The riots were motivated by increases in the prices mainly of bread and 
fuel as part of an economic emergency package recommended by the IMF. 
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 The 1989 parliamentary elections, which followed the King’s dissolution of the parliament as a 
result of the debt crisis, revealed that public mood was shifting towards Islamism.  The 
government having provided no immediate answers to the plight of the Jordanian people, the 
masses now turned to their only other option: the semi-moderate Muslim Brotherhood (or rather 
its political arm, the Islamic Action Front).  In addition, the Gulf War, initiated and eventually 
won by the West, did nothing to galvanize a new sense of national pride.  The war, in fact, 
further angered a public not only socially and economically in tatters, but largely sympathetic 
with Saddam Hussein and now humiliated as a race at the hands of the Americans.  These 
massive upheavals within Jordan and the Middle East coincided with the end, in 1988, of the first 
stage of the second critical process influencing the rise and maturity of jihadi Islam: the Soviet 
Afghan War.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the Arab mujahideen in 
Afghanistan led to the return of a large number of fighters to their respective countries.  
Empowered, triumphant and eager, these soldiers brought with them a new vision of enforcing 
change in their own countries by the raising of arms, imagining the establishment of the Islamic 
governments they had always sought to restore (Abu Rumman, b).  This war, as well as the 
period of the reign of the Taliban in Afghanistan is seen by some as one of the most important 
influences on the development of the Salafi Jihadi movement, purely because the environment of 
violence surrounding them, as well as their inevitable mixing and sharing of ideas, laid the 
foundation for their cohesion and synthesis as a violent network26 (Gharaibeh).  One of those to 
return was the modern Salafi Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (see below) who, 
from his arrival in 1992 onward, was relentless in lecturing against the regime as well as 
                                                 
26 It should also be noted that before these fighters reached Afghanistan, they were largely peaceful, practicing 
Muslims. (Gharaibeh) 
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democracy and elections, and further disseminating the Salafi jihadi creed through copies of his 
Millat Ibrahim (Ibrahim’s Creed) (ICG, p. 6).  The second stage of the critical “Afghan” process 
was to come slightly later, but there was no doubt that since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, 
armed Islamic groups, Salafi and otherwise, had been on the rise, whether at the local level or on 
the level of supporting the Palestinian intifada against the Israeli regime.  (Abu Rumman, b) 
Because many of the country’s youth were dissatisfied at this time with their government’s 
attempts to normalize with Israel, this led to the fostering of a number of small jihadi groups 
around the country throughout the 90’s.  These groups fought for various causes, some even in 
other jihadi arenas like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (Abu Rumman, a).  With a sense of 
dignity creeping back in after the loss of the Gulf War, the youth in Jordan started shaking off 
their feelings of weakness.  Dissemination of Salafi ideology was a key characteristic of this time, 
especially aided by many university professors emigrating from Saudi Arabia at the time. The 
Saudi immigrations were part of a larger process of immigration from the Gulf as a result of the 
mass deflation that the country was experiencing, and nowhere was Salafism stronger than in 
Saudi Arabia. (Abu Rumman, b) The first result of the approaching peace with Israel, the youth 
sentiment in the country at the time, and the spread of Salafism was in the form of a group called 
Jaysh Muhammad (Army of Muhammad). (Shehadeh)  Though it was not a hugely significant 
movement, Jaysh Muhammad was a sign of bigger things to come. 
 
To cap it all off, the Muslim Brotherhood, the group to whom the masses had so eagerly turned 
to revolutionize their lives, adopted a policy of non-confrontation with the Hashemite regime.  
The Brotherhood, deciding that their best method of influencing society was through political 
participation rather than open clashing, thus closed the door of political alternatives to a much 
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undecided and visionless society, leading to the final event that “crowned the series of Jordanian 
and Palestinian frustrations” (ICG, 6): the normalization of Jordanian relations with Israel 
resulting in the 1994 peace treaty.  These momentous events coupled with fundamental social 
transformation within Jordanian society paved the way for the newly envisioned Salafis, who not 
only offered the public a general alternative to their unresponsive government but also provided 
answers to their specific physical and mental needs.  Recognized by most scholarship as one of 
the most critical causes of radicalism, Alan Richards offers a concrete analysis of the role of 
Middle Eastern socio-economic conditions in the rise of political Islam.  
 
This is the era of social transition in the region, from conservatism to liberalism.  
It is an era that witnesses poverty and unemployment.  And it’s an era that is 
witnessing mass education, where more girls are coming out as educated girls, 
from high schools, colleges and universities.  You have two contradictory youth 
cultures in the country, diametrically opposed to each other.  One is pro-Western 
culture in every sense of the word…and opposite to it is very conservative Islamic 
culture. Instead of going to the café, [some] go to the mosque, where there is 
separation between men and women. These two cultures are coexisting together in 
this transitional era of our lives. (Abu Odeh) 
 
In this interview, Adnan Abu Odeh, former advisor to their Majesties Kings Hussein and 
Abdullah II of Jordan, captured one of Richards’ central arguments- that “radical 
movements have their greatest appeal when the dislocations of the transitions to 
modernity are most acute.” (p. 6) When this process of transition fails, especially with 
regards to the economic dimension, the legitimacy of regimes are eroded and the vision 
of young populations are turned elsewhere, toward a viable alternative (p. 6), which in 
this case are the outreaching jihadi groups, who not only offer concrete goals but tangible 
methods of attaining them.  In general, though, Richards explains that the transition of 
societies consisting largely of “illiterate farmers” –  in this case the Jordanian Bedouins – 
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who are ruled by a literate, urban elite, to an urban, mass educated society with a modern 
economy has “always and everywhere been deeply traumatic” (p. 5) 
 
The Sword and the Pen:  The Rise of Zarqawi and Maqdisi 
 
Born and raised within this exact milieu, and rearing to fill the void in his country, was a 
troubled boy from a small neighborhood of a little known town.  The man known infamously 
only as “Zarqawi” was born in the late 60’s in a small satellite city of Amman called Zarqa.  The 
name “Zarqawi” connotes a person whose roots are derived from the city itself, but he was 
identified at birth as Ahmad Fadheel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh27, a member of the native Bani 
Hassan tribe.  His full appellation as a grown man and leader of a vast network of jihadi Islamists 
stretching from Tehran to London is Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqawi.  The name “Mus’ab” was adapted 
from one of the Prophet Muhammad’s warriors, Mus’ab bin Umayer, who lost both of his hands 
in the Battle of Medina and is the patron-saint of suicide bombers28 (Gehriger, p. 1).  Leading a 
troubled childhood probably similar to that of many discontent juveniles around the world, 
Ahmad wandered the streets of his neighborhood, playing soccer, drinking alcohol excessively, 
starting fights, eventually joining a gang and finally dropping out of school at age seventeen 
(Shehadeh).   
 
                                                 
27 It is interesting to note that following the “Black Wednesday” (Nov. 9) bombings, all male members of the 
Khalayleh family signed a public statement addressed to King Abdullah II denouncing his actions and casting him 
out from the family. 
28 While this may reflect on his affinity for using suicide bombs for his operations, this information may be 
questionable as suicide bombers did not exist during the time of Muhammad the way they exist today, if at all, and 
in addition, suicide bombs are seen in Islam only as an exceptional tactic. 
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A rebel and bully, Ahmad grew up in the “al-Ma’assoum Quarter” of a city with both a disturbed 
past and present.  Zarqa, an industrial, working-class city consisting of over 450,000 Palestinians, 
Trans-Jordanians, Circassians and Jordanians lies about half an hour from Amman, the capital 
city of Jordan.  Marred by a high crime rate, Zarqa suffered a huge socio-economic blow in the 
early 90’s when, from around 250,000 Palestinians who were forced from Kuwait in the wake of 
the first Gulf War, over 160,000 of them settled in the city.  Lacking a strong tribal structure29 
due to the mixed population and its urban setting and suffering economically, Zarqa became the 
ideal recruiting ground for jihadi groups30. (ICG, p. 4) 
 
The turning point in Ahmad’s life is supposed to be the day he walked into the al-Falah Mosque 
situated in a Palestinian refugee camp near to his neighborhood where he found friends who 
introduced him to a radical form of Islam.  After becoming energized and familiarized with the 
movement, he departed during the spring of 1989 for Afghanistan to join the fight against the 
occupying Soviets alongside his mujahideen brothers.  He arrived in Afghanistan only to find out 
that the war was basically over.  Disappointed but not without vigor, he received a job with the 
Al-Qaeda propaganda publication Al-Bunyan al-Marsus31 for which he traveled around 
Afghanistan, gathering the experiences and testimonies of the mujahideen who had come from 
various parts of the Middle East to join the cause. During his travels, he came upon the writings 
of Abdullah Azzam, one of the leading proponents of the war32 and of pan-Islamic Jihad, and 
                                                 
29 Tribes have not only been the dominant form of social organization in Jordan, but have also played a huge role in 
the stability of the country since its inception.  The Bedouin tribes have a history of loyalty to the King in addition to 
forming a key contingent of the Jordan Arab Army (Jureidini and McLaurein, p. 37).  
30 Alan Richards supports this argument, stating that “arrest records from Egypt suggest that many of those arrested 
for violent opposition to regimes were from shanty towns surrounding large cities.” (Richards) 
31 The Solid Edifice. 
32 Abdullah Azzam had established a bureau which supported fighters going to Afghanistan.  Ironically, it was 
funded by the U.S., the U.K., Saudi Arabia and China, among others.  (CGI Report, 5)  The only reasonable 
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adopted his Salafi creed, gathering and internalizing his writings (Gehriger, p. 2).  When Zarqawi 
returned to Jordan, he reconnected with the Salafi ideologist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whom 
he had met years before in Peshawar, Pakistan, and had also turned to violence as a result of his 
experiences in Afghanistan.  Together with some other Jordanian veterans from the Afghan war, 
they formed Bayyat al-Imam33, a group formed to attack the sovereignty of the Hashemite 
regime in Jordan.  Their plan, however, was foiled by the Jordanian mukhabarat, who arrested 
and imprisoned them in 1994 for life under charges of weapons possession. (Abu Rumman) 
 
Swaqa prison is situated around 70 km south of Amman, right on the edge of the desert.  It was 
in this prison that Zarqawi trained himself mentally and physically for his future goals. He 
started memorizing the Qur’an, lifting makeshift weights, and learning the doctrine of the Salafi 
Jihadis from his colleague Maqdisi.  Commanding the respect and obedience of his fellow 
prisoners, Zarqawi turned that prison cell into a little camp where he coordinated the everyday 
lives of the prisoners, as well as (together with Maqdisi) training them and indoctrinating them in 
the Salafi creed (Gettleman, p. 3).  During their imprisonment, the movement around the country 
was also progressing, largely due to the repression many youth felt from the government’s move 
to take away their role models.  As Zarqawi and Maqdisi fought the justice system to secure their 
release, their supporters increased, spreading to cities such as Ma’an, Mafraq, Karak, Salt and 
Irbid (Abu Rumman, c).  Essentially, Maqdisi’s role in promoting the movement outside of 
prison was to spread his ideas and concentrate on getting more youth to join the ranks, which he 
did even from prison.  While a loose amalgamation of supporters existed outside the prison, 
coordination and maturation of the movement was taken care of in prison, and it was only a 
                                                                                                                                                             
explanation for the involvement of the U.S. and U.K. is that it was a short-sighted Cold War tactic to stop the spread 
of Communism. 
33 Fealty to the Imam. 
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matter of time before the prisoners, anxious to take their movement to the next level, would be 
released. Some of the fellow inmates recall Maqdisi’s poems written on the prison walls, 
invoking their patience and reminding them of the roads which lead to heaven (Abu Rumman, c).  
These prayers were finally answered when, in 1999, long-time king of Jordan, King Hussein, 
died and was replaced by his son, Abdullah II.  The prisoners were released through a royal 
decree issued by the new King, presumably to try and garner good relations with the established 
Islamists.  However, by the time of their release, they had already established a core group 
trained in violent operations, were far more focused on a doctrine that united all the small cells 
with jihadi views, and recognized a true leadership34.  They wanted Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi to 
be their leader, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi was content to forge ahead with the activity he 
had always been best at: providing the ideological dynamic for pushing ahead with a growing 
and maturing jihadi movement. (Abu Rumman) 
 
Despite their new-found focus, Zarqawi and Maqdisi had slight differences with each other, and 
this resulted in a parting of ways, if only physically. Maqdisi’s release constituted a qualitative 
transformation to the jihadi movement in Jordan, which was reflected in the public celebration of 
his release by his supporters. Seeing a new openness in the group, this husband and father of two, 
decided to remain in Jordan, thinking it better to build on the work they had started in the 
country,35 (Abu Rumman, c) while Zarqawi once again left Jordan to Afghanistan. A Spanish 
UCIE anti-terror unit report found that within a few months of his arrival in Afghanistan, 
Zarqawi had already climbed to the upper echelons of the Al-Qaeda leadership.  Apparently, Saif 
                                                 
34 Maqdisi, himself, states that imprisonment was a period of excellent growth for the Jordanian Salafi Jihad 
establishment, and that its framework was established there. (Abu Rumman, c) 
35 He was rearrested later, during the last months of 2002, and imprisoned at Qaf-Qaf Prison on charges of 
involvement in the “Mafraq” case and is wanted in other Arab countries for inciting violence in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia (Abu Rumman, a). Maqdisi is still in prison in Jordan after only a brief, four day release in 2005. 
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al-Adel, Osama bin Laden’s former military commander36, had heard about Zarqawi’s “historic 
pleas”, where he publicly insulted the King of Jordan during a court trial37 (Gehriger, p. 3).  Al-
Adel visited Zarqawi close to the end of 1999 and, though he found him rather unimpressive as a 
person and still rather impious (see below), he knew he had met a very ambitious man with clear 
goals in his sights.  The fundamental problem met by Al-Qaeda’s top brass (Bin Laden and his 
deputy, Ayman Zawahiri), though, was that while their own focus was to fight against “crusaders 
and Jews”38, Zarqawi concentrated on Jews and “corrupt” Arab regimes.  To resolve this, Bin 
Laden and Zawahiri gave him command of a military training camp in Herat and recommended 
him to start his own group.  Very contentedly, Zarqawi made his way to Herat from Kandahar 
(the Al-Qaeda hub in Afghanistan) and, along with his colleagues from the Sham39, established 
an iron rule in his camp, enforcing strict discipline and firm loyalty (ibid).  This new group 
called themselves Jund ash-Sham, or the Sham Soldiers.  While this core group was to become 
an important part of Zarqawi’s later operations, they had to abandon their camp in Herat due to 
the U.S.-Afghan War following the events of September 11th 2001.  In 2002, Zarqawi got injured 
and so escaped to northern Iraq, where some Jordanian Salafi leaders had already connected with 
a Kurdish Salafi group, Ansar al-Islam40.  Ansar welcomed Zarqawi, but he was somewhat 
discontented with their mode of operation due to their secretive nature, and so started carrying 
out operations against American, Israeli and Jordanian targets back at home (ibid).  In 2003, at 
the onset of the U.S. war on Iraq, Zarqawi moved from northern Iraq to Baghdad in order to fight 
the incoming U.S. army.  According to Urs Gehriger, Zarqawi’s own analysis of the tension 
                                                 
36 He also used to be a colonel in the Egyptian Special Forces.  Al-Adel is currently imprisoned in Iran. 
37 Maqdisi is also credited with similar actions. 
38 U.S.A and Israel, for the immediate future. 
39 The Sham is an Arabic term denoting the Greater Syria area.  The Bilad ash-Sham (Countries of the Sham) form a 
unit in Islamic terminology and is composed of Jordan, Syria, (occupied) Palestine and Lebanon (Shehadeh) 
40 Ansar al-Islam is a Kurdish jihadi group aimed at fighting Kurdish nationalist forces (Wikipedia). 
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between the Ba’athist Regime in Iraq and the White House led him to conclude that the 
Americans were inevitably bound to invade Iraq, and that this was the factor that originally led 
him to enter Iraq and set up and strengthen his network. (Gehriger , p. 4) 
 
It may be insightful at this point to make a break from the historical background of Zarqawi’s 
life and look more at his personal side.  There is little argument from most who have examined 
or spoken about his life that during his childhood, Ahmad Khalayleh was a rough, rebellious 
child.  Called the “green man” by his friends on account of the tattoos on his shoulders and arms 
(Gehriger, p. 1), Zarqawi was both bossy and serious, as well as largely uneducated.  Despite his 
rough side, though, Abu Mus’ab also had a very intimate, tender side. He was close to his mother 
and took care of her during her struggle with leukemia.  According to his fellow inmates at 
Swaqa, Zarqawi would sometimes “retreat to his bed, which he had turned into a tent by draping 
it with blankets.  Sometimes crying was heard, other times he spent hours bent over a sheet of 
paper, drawing patterns, roses and hearts with childlike diligence.” (Gehriger, p. 2)  Most of 
them were supposedly sent to his mother, Umm Sayel.  His letters were signed al-Gharib, which 
means “the stranger” and his personality is said to have completely changed during this spell in 
prison. Umm Sayel died from the leukemia in February of 2000 at the age of 62, and according 
to another associate, her last wish was for Ahmad to be killed in battle rather than dying under 
captivity (Gettleman, p. 4).  Saif al-Adel, during his visit to Zarqawi (see above), commented 
that in his first meeting with him, he was immediately struck by Zarqawi’s weaknesses.  He 
noted a man with “poor rhetorical skills, who expressed what was on his mind bluntly.”  He also 
found him to have few practical experiences with jihad.  (Gehriger, p. 3) However, following the 
success of his camp in Herat, Zarqawi seems to have learned hard and fast the tricks of the jihadi 
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trade.  Quoted in Urs Gehriger’s in-depth report on Zarqawi’s life, Saif al-Adel explained his 
delight at the new Zarqawi: 
 
Saif al-Adel rejoiced over the “great progress”.  And noted a remarkable 
transformation in Zarqawi himself:  “By the start of 2001, Abu Musab had 
become a different person.”  Talkative, interested in high-level politics, he had 
even developed an understanding for public relations.  He now made a “much 
more convincing” overall impression.  He had begun to think about the future and 
to plan it strategically “all of which are indicators for the emergence of an 
outstanding leadership figure”.  At this point, only a small circle knew about the 
skills of the emerging Prince of Terror. (Gehriger, ibid) 
 
 
Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad fee Bilaad al-Rafidain and Jund ash-Sham 
 
Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqawi’s move to Iraq represents the next level of Salafi Jihadi 
operation within the region, a subject far too complex to discuss meaningfully within the 
space of a few pages.  That said, any discussion of the Salafi Jihadi movement in Jordan 
would be incomplete without at least touching on the effect of Jordan’s legacy on Salafi 
Jihadism’s new stage:  Iraq.  Firstly, it needs to be said that since his books and messages 
appeared in the nineties, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s scholarship is considered the 
most important body of literature for the jihadi movement.  His writings are still studied 
and disseminated throughout the membership, and he operates a website visited by 
thousands of sympathizers.  Secondly, Zarqawi, upon arriving in Baghdad, established a 
new group built to fight alongside the Iraqi national resistance against the Americans.  
Though the resistance as a whole is now a complex fusion of the socialist B’aathi’s and 
the Salafi Jihadis (Gharaibeh, a), Zarqawi’s network of fighters, Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad 
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fee Bilaad al-Rafidain41 has still overshadowed the national resistance movement as a 
whole, and presents the biggest threat to American troops within the area.  In addition, he 
still operates Jund al-Sham, the group he started in Herat, which has a separate mission of 
defeating “the close enemy” in the Sham countries.  Though Zarqawi is obviously 
primarily focused on defeating the American occupation of Iraq, he is still said to be 
setting up and developing cells in places such as the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan. 
 
This substantial new phase of expansion was amply displayed in his success in 
organizing both the rocket attacks on an American naval ship off the coast of Jordan in 
August of 2005 as well as the infinitely more significant November 2005 bombings of 
three Western hotels in Amman, the largest jihadi operation in the modern history of 
Jordan.  These events signify not only his growing power and coordination, but also the 
expansion of Iraqi membership within the ranks of his network through his participation 
in the U.S.-Iraq War.  In the words of Marwan Shehadeh, “the Americans succeeded in 
their globalization of the war on terror, but on the other hand, the Salafi Jihadis 
succeeded in globalizing the terms of Jihad.”  (Shehadeh) In the current political 
atmosphere, it is hard to realistically see it any other way. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 This group was first heard of in March of 2003 and now represents the Al-Qaeda Organization in Iraq (Qaedat al-
Jihad fee Bilaad al-Rafidain) (Abu Rumman) 
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THE MYTH OF SECURITY 
 
The purpose of this paper was not to offer any new and inventive ways of combating 
“terrorists”.  It does, though, offer the background, however inadequately, of how we can 
approach “extremists”.  Essentially, the argument I make can be summarized as the 
difference between these two.  While the dominant rhetoric in media, Western 
scholarship and commonspeak is one that assumes that members of jihadi groups are 
something other than humans with radical answers to important questions, it is my 
argument that such approaches to this problem can, and have, only spawned further 
radicalism in society.  Extremism in any form is usually harmful to anyone or anything 
surrounding it, and this is not limited to Salafi Jihadis, who make up only one of many 
extremist groups and networks in the world.  Therefore, yes, prevention and security from 
it should be a top priority, as it already is.  Security and intelligence services the world 
over are at the forefront of local and international governmental work, oftentimes 
demanding massive budgets and increased efforts to carry out their duties.  That this 
trend exists in almost every country of the globe is a sure reflection of humanity’s need to 
feel secure, and it is most definitely not this that is the problem.  The work of 
governments to eliminate extremism, however, lacks the mindfulness of the nature of the 
problem.  The nature of security in the modern age is one of “seek and destroy”, most of 
the time through military means.  And again, sometimes this is necessary.  The argument 
here is not against any of the methods mankind has so devised to meet this problem, 
rather it is one which develops the “intelligence” dimension of security.  The reality is 
that we are fighting passions, passions to live, passions to be recognized, passions to 
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fulfill ourselves as humans, passions to create the world as we see best can surmise it.  
When policymakers and the masses create an atmosphere of legitimate consideration for 
the totality of the earth’s needs and problems, and thus considering, contemplate their 
own specific problems, then will we have gotten to a point where we, as humans, can 
make informed and appropriate decisions about the lives of other humans.  Such veins of 
thought have, in the past, largely been considered “soft” or “abstract”, but humans 
themselves have proven otherwise.  Salafi Jihadis represent the pinnacle of this plight, 
manifested in their discontent with an unjust society, the total dismissal of the identity of 
their forefathers, and the discarding of values and norms wholly normal and practiced 
within their communities.  The mere act of recognizing what separates us as humans 
allows us to see our common humanity, if only because we acknowledge each other.  In 
the words of a famous 19th century Iranian philosopher, 
 
The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable unless and 
until its unity is firmly established. 
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